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A novel communication protocol based on an entangled pair of qubits is presented, allowing secure
direct communication from one party to another without the need for a shared secret key. Since the
information is transferred in a deterministic manner, no qubits have to be discarded and every qubit
carries message information. The security of the transfer against active and passive eavesdropping
attacks is provided. The detection rate of active attacks is at least 25%. The protocol works with
a quantum efficiency of 1 bit per qubit transmitted.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is secure direct communication? Traditionally,
secure communication schemes based on quantum me-
chanics are non-deterministic [1–5]: Alice, the sender,
cannot determine which bit value Bob receives through
the secure quantum channel. Such non-deterministic
communication can be used to establish a secret key be-
tween Alice and Bob. Whenever an eavesdropper tries
to extract information from the quantum channel, he in-
fluences the transmitted state and can be detected with
some probability. If Alice and Bob are virtually sure that
a certain random subsequence of bits has been transmit-
ted secretely, Alice can use the remaining subsequence
as a shared secret key to encrypt her message, send the
encrypted message to Bob through a non-secret channel
and then Bob uses the shared key to decrypt the mes-
sage. It is a common belief that every secure quantum
communication protocol should work that way.
Recently, however, a deterministic quantum crypto-
graphic protocol has been presented [6,7], which I will
refer to as the BEKW protocol. Against the paradigm of
quantum cryptography, the information is sent directly
from Alice to Bob. Alice uses a secret key to encrypt
her message before sending it through a quantum chan-
nel. If she is virtually sure that no eavesdropper was
in the line, Alice publishes the secret key so Bob can
read the message. This is a different concept of quan-
tum cryptography, and I will refer to it as secure di-
rect communication as opposed to quantum key distribu-
tion. In the present paper, another deterministic crypto-
graphic scheme is presented which has significant advan-
tages against other schemes:
1. High quantum efficiency: 1 bit per qubit.
2. Reliable security: Detection probability d = 1/4
per control qubit.
3. Deterministic: No qubits are discarded. The mes-
sage is send directly.
The magic ingredient for the protocol is entanglement.
Alice has to prepare and measure Bell pairs, and she
must be able to store one of the entangled qubits for a
certain time (some milliseconds will do). Even if it might
still be difficult to prepare and to measure the Bell states,
and in particular to store entangled qubits, the presented
scheme contains a completely new approach to assure
the security of a communication. In order to illustrate
the quality of the protocol, let us compare it with other
schemes. In non-deterministic protocols, Alice and Bob
choose at random one of several possible bases to pre-
pare and/or to measure the transmitted qubit. If their
choices does not coincide, the qubit is discarded since the
outcome is completely uncorrelated. In the BB84 proto-
col [1] every second qubit is discarded that way, so the
quantum transmission rate,
Rq =
N(usable bits)
N(qubits)
, (1)
is Rq = 0.5. The protocol needs an additional classical
channel carrying 2 bits per transmission (the choices of
basis), so the total rate
Rtot =
N(usable bits)
N(qubits) + N(bits)
, (2)
is Rtot = 0.5/(1+2) = 1/6. Since the usable bits form the
shared secret key, there is still the need for a subsequent
classical transfer of the same bit size carrying the message
information. The same goes for the Ekert scheme [2]. In
the BEKW protocol, every transmitted qubit can directly
be used for the message, but only two of them carry one
message bit, so Rq = 0.5. The additional classical chan-
nel carries 2 bits per transmission, so Rtot = 1/6. In the
protocol presented here, two qubits and 2 bits of message
information are transmitted, hence Rq = 1. The classical
channel transfers 2 bits, so Rtot = 2/(2 + 2) = 1/2. No
further transmission is required. All the rates given above
do not include control bits. So let us roughly compare the
security of the protocols, which depends on the detection
probability d per transmitted control qubit. The BB84
and the Ekert protocol provide d = 1/4, the BEKW pro-
tocol provides d = 1/6, and the protocol presented here
provides d = 1/4.
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II. DOUBLE DENSE CODING
Let us start with a protocol that is not designed for se-
curity but for highly efficient use of quantum resources.
Afterwards we will construct from there the secure pro-
tocol.
Alice controls a device that is able to prepare two
qubits in one of the Bell states
|0±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), (3)
|1±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉), (4)
forming the orthogonal Bell basis BBell. Let us bring the
Bell states in some order,
|Ψ0〉 = |0+〉, |Ψ1〉 = |0−〉, (5)
|Ψ2〉 = |1+〉, |Ψ3〉 = |1−〉. (6)
Alice decides to send the value a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by prepar-
ing the initial state |Ψa〉 ∈ BBell, which she can easily
look up in Fig. 1.
j0+i j0 i j1+i j1 i
0 21 3
FIG. 1. Alice’s coding scheme.
After the state is prepared, Alice sends only the second
qubit, which we call the travel qubit, and she keeps the
first one, which we call the home qubit. Bob receives the
travel qubit and performs one of the four unitary opera-
tions
σ0 = 1 = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (7)
σ1 = σx = |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|, (8)
σ2 = σy = i|1〉〈0| − i|0〉〈1|, (9)
σ3 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, (10)
forming the set P . These matrices are unitary and her-
mitian at the same time, so each one is its own inverse,
σ2i = 1, and although they are local operations, they
switch between the non-local Bell states in the following
manner:
(1⊗ σ0)|n±〉 ∼ |n±〉, (11)
(1⊗ σ1)|n±〉 ∼ |m±〉, (12)
(1⊗ σ2)|n±〉 ∼ |m∓〉, (13)
(1⊗ σ3)|n±〉 ∼ |n∓〉, (14)
with n ∈ {0, 1} and m = 1 − n. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we have neglected the irrelevant global phase on the
righthand side. Bob receives the travel qubit from Alice
and encodes b ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by performing σb on it. After
that, he sends the travel qubit back to Alice. Alice then
performs a Bell measurement on both qubits resulting
in one of the four Bell states. Let us call this resulting
state the final state |Ψf 〉 ∈ BBell. Since she knows the
state |Ψa〉 she initially prepared, she now also knows the
operation σb Bob has performed by solving
|Ψf 〉 ∼ (1⊗ σb)|Ψa〉. (15)
Since there are 4 possible operations intentionally per-
formed by Bob, Alice has received 2 bits of deterministic
information from him. If she now tells Bob via a classical
channel the final Bell state |Ψf 〉 resulting from her mea-
surement, then Bob can calculate the initial state |Ψa〉
by inverting (15). Since there are 4 possible initial Bell
states that Alice intentionally prepared, Bob has received
2 bits of deterministic information from her. Instead cal-
culating, Alice and Bob can also look at the transforma-
tion table in Fig. 2 to decode the other one’s message.
j0+i j0 i
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FIG. 2. Transformation table.
The table indicates the effect of the local operations
σb to the Bell state. For example, σ2 transforms |0+〉 ↔
|1−〉 and |0−〉 ↔ |1+〉. Not indicated is the effect of
σ0 = 1, which does nothing. The transmission scheme is
depicted in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3. Double dense coding: 4 bits are exchanged by one
entangled qubit travelling forth and back.
The efficiency of this protocol is high: 1 qubit trav-
els forth and back between Alice and Bob and 4 bits
of information are exchanged, which makes a quantum
transmission rate of 2 bits per transmitted qubit. The
origin of such high efficiency is the same as in the dense
coding protocol [8]: entanglement. The present proto-
col works in a similiar manner and since it works in two
directions simultaneously, let us call it a double dense
coding protocol.
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III. EAVESDROPPING
Say there is eavesdropper Eve having full access to the
quantum channels between Alice and Bob. Whatever
measurement Eve might be performing, the travel qubit
carries no information about the initial state prepared by
Alice, because the state of the travel qubit equals for any
initial Bell state the complete mixture,
∀a : ρ1 = Tr2{|Ψa〉〈Ψa|} = 1
2
1. (16)
However, Eve can gain some information about Bob’s
message. If Eve measures the travel qubit coming from
Alice in some basis, resends it in a certain state, and
then measures the state of the qubit returned by Bob,
she can gain 1 bit of information about the action that
was performed on the qubit. Such an attack is called
intercept-resend attack.
But Eve is really smart. She captures the qubit as it
travels from Alice to Bob. Then she prepares another
“evil” Bell state |Ψe〉, sends one of its qubits as a travel
qubit to Bob, who performs his operation and sends it
back to Alice. But Eve also catches that qubit and per-
forms a Bell measurement on both evil qubits. Now she
knows exactly the operation σb that Bob has performed
and hence got his message. She applies the operation
σb to the captured “friendly” travel qubit and sends it
back to Alice, who performs a Bell measurement result-
ing in the final state |Ψf 〉. When Alice announces the
final state |Ψf 〉, Eve can calculate the initial state |Ψa〉
and hence got Alice’s message. Bob performs the same
calculation and also obtains |Ψa〉. So even if Alice and
Bob would sacrifice their bits to compare them publicly,
they would not notice that Eve was in the line. To Alice
Eve acts like Bob and to Bob Eve acts like Alice. Such
an evil thing is called a man-in-the-middle attack and is
depicted in Fig. 4.
Alice Eve Bobj	ai j	ei 
b
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FIG. 4. Eve as the “man in the middle”: total control.
There is no protection against a man-in-the-middle at-
tack except: a public channel. This is a channel that
spreads its information content all over the world. Eve
can read and write to the channel, but she cannot manip-
ulate it. If even the public channel is under full control of
Eve, then let us call this a strong man-in-the-middle at-
tack or a Berlusconi attack. The protocol presented here
is secure against weak man-in-the-middle attacks: it does
not allow Eve to manipulate the public channel. A fairly
good public channel is already given by an ordinary radio
signal.
Apart from active attacks described above, there can
also be passive attacks. Once the final state |Ψf 〉 is pub-
lished, the messages of Alice and Bob are strongly cor-
related via (15). An eavesdropper could try a so-called
known plaintext attack : If there is some part of Alice’s
or Bob’s message that is likely to appear in the message
at a certain position (e.g. “Hi Baby” or “See you”), the
eavesdropper can immediately decypher the other one’s
part of the message at the same position. No serious
cryptosystem should allow that.
IV. THE FINAL PROTOCOL
First we abandon the “full duplex” property of the
double dense coding scheme and allow only Alice to send
messages to Bob. Bob uses a random number genera-
tor to choose the operation σb he performs on the travel
qubit. Bob’s random sequence of operations acts like a
secret key on Alice’s message.
Next we have to make sure that Eve is detected with
nonzero probability while she is trying to do active at-
tacks. Let us introduce two modes, the message mode
and the control mode. In message mode, Alice and Bob
perform the double dense coding protocol, but Alice does
not tell the final state she has measured. With probabil-
ity λc Bob switches from message mode to control mode.
Now, instead of performing his operation, Bob randomly
chooses a basis Bi out of the two bases B0 = {|00〉, |10〉}
or B1 = {|01〉, |11〉}, where
|00〉 = |0〉, |10〉 = |1〉, (17)
|01〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |11〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (18)
He performs a measurement in the basis Bi on the travel
qubit and instead returning Alice the travel qubit, Bob
sends her his choice of basis and his measurement result
through the public channel. Now Alice also switches to
control mode and performs a measurement in the same
basis on her home qubit. Then she looks if the result
is correlated or anticorrelated to Bob’s result. Since she
(and only she) knows the initial state |ψa〉, she sees if the
correlation is wrong or right. If the correlation is wrong,
she knows that someone was in the line and stops the
communication. If the correlation is correct, she repeats
the preceding run in message mode because the last qubit
she sent has been sacrificed.
At the end of an undisturbed communication sequence,
Alice sends Bob the list of final Bell states she has mea-
sured. Since Bob knows the sequence of operations he
performed, he can decypher Alice’s messages by solv-
ing (15) or using Fig. 2.
Now here is the explicit algorithm realizing the pro-
tocol. Alice wants to communicate the message a =
a1 · · ·aN , where an ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
p.0) Protocol is initialized. n = 0, f = b = ∅.
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p.1) n = n + 1. Alice prepares two qubits in the Bell
state |ψan〉.
p.2) She keeps the first qubit, the home qubit, and sends
the other one, the travel qubit, to Bob.
p.3) Bob receives the travel qubit. With probability λc
he switches to control mode and proceeds with c.1,
else he proceeds with m.1.
c.1) Bob chooses at random a basis Bi ∈ {B0,B1}.
c.2) He measures the travel qubit in the basis Bi
and obtains the value j ∈ {0, 1} with equal
probability.
c.3) He sends ij through the public channel to Al-
ice.
c.4) Alice receives ij through the public channel,
switches to control mode and measures her
home qubit in the basis Bi resulting in the
value k.
c.5) (|ψan〉 = |0±〉∧j 6= k)∨(|ψan〉 = |1±〉∧j = k):
Eve is detected. Abort or Goto p.0.
Else set n = n− 1 and goto p.1.
m.1) Bob takes a number bn ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} from his
random number generator, appends the value
bn to the list b, applies the operation σbn to
the travel qubit and sends it back to Alice.
m.2) Alice receives the travel qubit and makes a
Bell measurement on both qubits resulting in
the final state |ψfn〉 ∈ BBell. She appends the
value fn to the list f .
m.3) n < N : Goto p.1.
n = N : Goto p.4.
p.4) Alice sends the list f to Bob.
p.5) For each (fn, bn) Bob decodes an via
|Ψan〉 ∼ (1⊗ σbn)|Ψfn〉, (19)
or by looking at Fig. 2.
The published sequence f is completely uncorrelated
with Alice’s message a, since the sequence b of operations
is a random sequence. Just like a one-time pad scheme,
there is no way to break the cryptosystem by passive at-
tacks, if the sequence b is truly random and used only
once, which we assume here. After the qubit has arrived
at Bob, with probability λc he activates control mode,
so Eve has no chance to adapt her strategy. If she has
been replacing the travel qubit with another qubit, using
intercept-resend or man-in-the-middle strategy, it is not
entangled with Alice’s home qubit, and with probability
1/2 she has forwarded a state in a basis different from
Bob’s. If so, then with another probability of 1/2 the
measurements of Alice and Bob, which are performed in
the same basis, show the wrong type of correlation, hence
with total probability d = 1/4 Eve is detected. The pub-
lic channel is needed to synchronize Alice and Bob in
control mode.
Alice Eve Bobj	ai j	ei k(b)k(b)
? ?
Public Channel
FIG. 5. Quantum correlations and a public channel unveil
evil Eve.
The probability for a control transfer is λc, so for N
protocol runs the number of control runs is Nc = λcN ,
and with Eve attacking all the time, the probability that
she stays undetected reads
D(N) = (1− d)λcN =
(
3
4
)λcN
. (20)
The above value can be made arbitrarily small by choos-
ing an λc and N appropriately. Concluding, the protocol
is asymptotically secure against active and passive at-
tacks.
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